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Sammendrag 
Denne artikkelen diskuterer hvordan spesifikasjon av probabilistiske modeller for fler-tilstands 
varighetsdata generert fra individuelle valg kan begrunnes. Preferansene til aktørene antas 
representerte ved en stokastisk nyttefunksjon som antas stokastisk også for aktøren. Artikkelen starter 
med å foreslå en karakterisering av eksogene preferanser, dvs. si spesialtilfellet uten strukturell 
tilstandsavhengighet. Denne karakteriseringen sier at når preferansene er eksogene, så vil den indirekte 
nytten ved et gitt tidspunkt ikke være korrelert med nåværende og tidligere valg, gitt de uobserverbare 
variablene som er kjent for aktøren. Det vises at denne antakelsen, i tillegg til svake regularitets-
betingelser, impliserer en nyttefunksjon som er en såkalt Extremal stokastisk prosess. Videre medfører 
dette resultatet at valgmodellen er en Markov kjede (i kontinuerlig- eller diskret tid), med overgangs-
sannsynligheter som har en bestemt funksjonsform, som eksplisitt funksjon av parametrene i nytte-
funksjonen. Deretter diskuteres det hvordan modellrammen kan utvides til å ta hensyn til strukturell 
tilstandsavhengighet. Det diskuteres også hvordan en versjon av Chamberlains betingede estimerings-
metode kan anvendes når en har fixed effects. Til slutt diskuteres to eksempler på anvendelser. 
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1. Introduction 
The issue of functional form in behavioral relations in the social sciences is a problematic one.  In 
contrast to physics where the theory of the phenomenon under study often yields a complete 
characterization of the corresponding quantitative structural relations, the theories in social sciences 
are typically qualitative and imply little guidance as regards explicit mathematical functional form.  
 This paper discusses how to justify functional form relations of duration models. More 
precisely, we consider how hazard functions and transition probabilities generated by individual 
choice behavior in continuous-or discrete time should be modeled.1 We assume a probabilistic 
formulation in which preferences are represented by utilities that not only are perceived as random to 
the researcher, but are also viewed as random to the individual agent. Psychologists have found that 
preferences often appear to be random to the agent himself, cf. Thurstone (1927) and Tversky (1969). 
The explanation is that the agent may express some uncertainty in their evaluation of alternatives and 
consequently assess different values to the same, or seemingly equivalent alternative, at different 
points in time. This includes updating of preferences due to information that arrives at random points 
in time (as perceived by the agent).2  
 In general, preferences may be serially correlated due to habit persistence, structural state 
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity. Unobserved heterogeneity stems from unobservables that 
may be perfectly known, or partly uncertain, to the agent. See Heckman (1981a) for a lucid discussion 
within a multivariate probit framework. In several analyses it is of interest to separate the genuine 
effect on preferences (or choice constraints) due to choice experience on one hand (structural state 
dependence), from the effect from unobserved heterogeneity and habit persistence on the other. It is 
known that this identification problem cannot be settled by statistical methods alone. Additional a 
priori theoretical restrictions are needed, see for example Heckman, (1981a,b, 1991), Jaggia and 
Trivedi (1994) and Magnac (2000). The theory proposed in this paper implies an explicit functional 
form characterization of the model that brings us a step further towards resolving the identification of 
state dependence effects. 
 We first provide a characterization of the individual’s preferences and the implied choice 
model in the special case with no state dependence, conditional on the information of the agent. That 
is, we propose a characterization of the utility representation and the corresponding choice model, 
                                                     
1 For an overview of duration model with particular reference to economics, see van den Berg (2001). 
2 This type of uncertainty is thus different from the lottery setting with uncertain outcomes, because although the utilities may 
vary from moment to moment in a manner that is not fully predictable to the agent, the decision process consists of selecting 
the alternative with the largest momentary utility, and, at the moment of choice, the utilities are known to the agent. 
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conditional on unobservables that are perfectly known to the agent. Sometimes it may be reasonable to 
represent unobservables by fixed or random effects. It follows from the setting described above that 
since preferences may contain elements that are random to the agent himself the conditional utility 
representation given the agents (current) information may be random (to the agent). Moreover, even in 
the case with no state dependence there may be habit persistence implying that the conditional 
preferences are serially correlated (given the information of the agent). Subsequently, we extend the 
characterization to the case that allows for structural state dependence. Let the “reference case” be 
defined as the special case with no state dependence. In this case we propose an intuitive definition of 
what one should understand by random preferences being exogenous. Specifically, this definition 
asserts that in the reference case, the indirect utility (conditional on unobservables known by the 
agent) at any current or future point in time is independent of current and previously chosen 
alternatives (states). The underlying intuition is that since the utility function represents the value of 
the respective states, once maximum utility has been achieved, it should (in the reference case) be 
irrelevant for level of maximum utility which of the states that yields the maximum. This assumption 
seems almost inescapable: In fact, if this were not so, not all relevant aspects of the states would be 
captured by the utility function since knowledge about the actual choice and the choice history would 
represent relevant information about the level of the utility of the current choice. However, this 
contradicts the notion of utility as an “ideal” index which by definition is meant to capture the value of 
all relevant aspects of the states. 
 Under suitable regularity assumptions, it follows from this definition of exogenous random 
preferences that the utility, ( )jU t  of state j at time t, viewed as a stochastic process in time (and 
conditional on unobservables known to the agent), becomes a so called Extremal process (possibly 
with deterministic drift). The Extremal process is analogous to the Brownian motion. Whereas the 
updating algorithm for the Brownian motion has the property that the realization in the current period 
is obtained as the sum of the realization at the previous period plus an independent increment, the 
realization of the Extremal process in the current period equals the maximum of the previous 
realization (possibly depreciated) and an independent “increment”. Current utilities may depend on the 
utilities in the previous period due to habit persistence. The corresponding conditional choice process 
(given the unobservables known to the agent) turns out to be a Markov chain with a particular 
functional form of the transition probabilities (hazard functions) in terms of parameters of the 
underlying utility function.  
Evidently, the assumption of the reference case is often too restrictive. We therefore discuss 
how the framework may be extended to allow for structural state dependence. In this case the Markov 
property will no longer hold. As mentioned above, this extended modeling framework allows us to 
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separate structural state dependence effects from habit persistence provided we know the distribution 
of unobservables than are known to the agent. 
 Dagsvik (2002) has provided an alternative axiomatization of behavioral duration models. 
Specifically, he proposed an intertemporal version of IIA and demonstrated that it implies extremal 
utility processes. In contrast to Dagsvik (2002), this paper allows the utilities to be interdependent 
across alternatives, with multivariate extreme value distribution. Also the regularity conditions 
assumed by Dagsvik (2002) are considerably stronger that the ones postulated in this paper. It follows 
that the results of Dagsvik (2002) are special cases of the results of this paper. 
 Whereas the results referred to above are obtained under the assumptions of choice sets being 
constant over time, we also consider the case where choice sets may be non-decreasing over time. A 
general treatment of time varying choice sets is, however, rather complicated, and the analysis of this 
case is left for another occasion. However, in practice it may not be evident how interesting it is in 
applications to allow for time varying choice sets since one may always approximate the case where 
some alternatives disappear by weighting down the utilities of the respective alternatives so that they 
become very unattractive and consequently will almost never be chosen although they formally belong 
to the choice set. 
In many applications it is of interest to allow for alternative-specific fixed or random effects. 
Recall that the model structure is derived conditional on unobservables that may sometimes be 
represented by random- or fixed effects, and it is therefore of particular interest to allow for such 
effects in our framework. We discuss identification in this case and we indicate how one can derive 
conditional maximum likelihood estimation procedures in these cases, similarly to Chamberlain 
(1980).  
Another interesting challenge is the potential extension of the framework developed in this 
paper to models for discrete dynamic programming, similar to Rust (1987). A full treatment of the 
case with uncertainty and stochastic dynamic programming is, however, beyond the scope of the 
present paper and will be discussed elsewhere.  
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we propose a characterization of the utility 
function as a random function of time (utility process) and we derive their implications for the 
stochastic structure of the utility process. In section 3 we derive implications for the corresponding 
probabilistic choice model for the case with non-decreasing choice sets. In section 5 we discuss how 
one can allow for structural state dependence and in section 6 we deal with identification. In section 7 
we discuss how to apply the modeling framework to analyze labor supply and sectoral mobility in a 
static and a life cycle setting, respectively.  
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2. Characterization of preferences  
We shall now assert assumptions with the purpose of obtaining a theoretical justification of the 
quantitative structure of the model. Let S be the universal set of alternative, that is, the maximal set of 
available alternatives, and let it be represented by the index set {1, 2, …, m}. The actual choice set B 
may be equal to S or be a proper subset of S. In this section we assume that the actual choice sets do 
not vary over time. Let ( )jU t  denote the agent’s utility of being in state j (alternative j) at time (or age 
t), ,j S∈  utility function is assumed to be a random function. In the context of life cycle analysis it 
may be thought of as a reduced form value function representing current and future uncertain 
prospects. Let ( )J t denote the chosen alternative (state) from S at time t, ( )jZ t  a vector of exogenous 
and observable alternative-specific attributes, and ( )j tξ  an exogenous random variable that captures 
the effect of unobservables on the utility of alternative j at time t  that are perfectly known by the 
agent. Moreover, let ( ) { ( ), }h t J s s t= <  and ( ) { ( ), , 1,2,..., }.jU t U s s t j m= < = That is, h(t) represents 
the choice history prior to t and ( )U t  represents all the agent’s utilities prior to time t. Analogous to 
Heckman (1981a), a fairly general utility representation of preferences may be written as 
 
(2.1)  ( ) ( ( ), ( ), ( )) ( ( ), ( )),j j j j jU t v Z t t h t g U t tξ η= +   
 
where ( )v ⋅  and ( )jg ⋅  are suitable deterministic functions. Whereas ( )j tξ is known to the agent, the 
variable ( )j tη  is random to the agent, in the sense of Thurstone (1927). Since utility is random, the 
function { ( ), 0}J t t >  will be a random process. Thurstone’s argument for allowing tastes to be random 
to the agent himself was that agents are viewed as having difficulties with assessing a precise and 
definitive value of the respective alternatives. Evidence from laboratory experiments as well as 
everyday observations indicate that, (i) the agents may have taste for variation, (ii) they may find it 
hard to assess the value of the alternatives because they may be unsure about their tastes and their 
perceptions may be influenced by fluctuating moods and whims, (iii) they may have limited 
information about the alternatives and may receive unanticipated information over time.  
Let 1 2{ ( ), 0} {( ( ), ( ),..., ( )), 0}mU t t U t U t U t t≥ ≡ ≥  denote the utility function (vector of utilities) 
of the agent.  
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 Assumption 1 (definition of exogenous random preferences) 
 Conditional on the agent’s information, the value process, {max ( ), },k kU t sτ τ≥ ≥  restricted 
to the time interval [ , ],s t  is independent of the choice history prior to s, { ( ), },J sτ τ ≤  for any 
0 .s t< ≤  
 
 Note that the assertion in Assumption 1 is only supposed to hold conditional on the agent’s 
information. It asserts that the indirect utility at time t is independent of current and past choices. 
Recall first that in the standard deterministic duality theory the indirect utility is fully determined by 
income, prices and possible constraints. Thus, knowledge of which alternative is the most preferred 
does not represent additional information of relevance for the determination of the indirect utility 
function. Consider the stochastic setting. For simplicity, consider the special case of choice behavior at 
one point in time. As in the deterministic case, the indirect utility max ( )k kU t  is completely 
determined by preferences and choice constraints (prices, income and choice set). Thus, when 
preferences are exogenous, and consequently unaffected by previous choice experience, knowledge 
about J(t) will not represent information that is relevant for assessing the value of the level of 
max ( ).k kU t  If max ( )k kU t  were correlated with the choice J(t) it would mean that not all information 
that is relevant for the agent’s indirect utility is captured by the utilities, which means that the utility 
function would be ill defined. To further facilitate interpretation consider a large number of 
independent replications of a choice experiment. “Independent” means here that the respective random 
terms are drawn independently across experiments. In different replications the choices and the 
indirect utilities may be different due to different draws of the random terms. However, if the indirect 
utility and the choice were correlated it would mean that the c.d.f. of the indirect utility, given that 
state 1 (say) was chosen would be different from the corresponding c.d.f. given that state 2 (say) was 
chosen. This appears inconsistent with the fact that the agent’s perception about the value of each 
alternative is fully represented by the utility function.  
 
 Assumption 2  
 At each given point in time t, and conditional on the agent’s information, the utility process 
has the following properties:   
(i)  ( ) ( ) ( ),U t v t tε= +  
( )v t is a deterministic vector and ( )tε is a random vector that is independent of ( ).v t  Moreover, ( )v t  
can attain any value in ,mR  
(ii)           1{ ( ), 0}U t t ≥  is independent of the processes 2 3{( ( ), ( ),..., ( )), 0}mU t U t U t t ≥   
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and 
(iii)          { ( ), 0}U t t ≥  is continuous in probability. 
 
 Note that the separability condition in (i) is rather weak. For example, the GEV (Generalized 
Extreme Value) model fulfils this condition. Dagsvik (1994) has demonstrated that within the class of 
random utility models the GEV model implies no (essential) restrictions on the choice probabilities. 
Note that the assertion that ( )tη  is independent of ( )v t  does not necessarily imply that the stochastic 
process { ( ), 0}t tε ≥  is independent of the deterministic process { ( ), 0}.v t t ≥  For example, even if 
( )tε and ( )v t are independent, ( )tε  may depend on ( )v s for some s < t. Using the notation of eq. (2.1) 
we note that ( ) ( ( ), ( )).j j jt g U t tε η=   Condition (ii) does not seem to be an essential restriction due to 
the fact that at most utility differences can be identified (in a distributional sense), see Strauss (1979, 
Corollary 1, p. 40). This condition is necessary for achieving central theoretical results. However, 
some results obtained in this paper will continue to hold even if assertion (iii) is dropped, as we shall 
discuss below. Condition (iii) is a regularity property and the concept “continuity in probability” 
means that the probability that | ( ) ( ) | ,j jU s U t δ− >  for any 0,δ >  tends towards zero as s tends 
towards t. In our context continuity in probability is a rather weak condition, and it does not imply that 
the sample paths of the process { ( ), 0}jU t t ≥  are necessarily continuous. For example, a stochastic 
process with jumps may still be continuous in probability. The continuity-in-probability condition only 
implies that the jumps of the process cannot occur “too frequently”.  
 Although the additive separability conditions (i) of Assumption 2 is a typical one that is often 
routinely invoked, it is nevertheless ad hoc from a theoretical perspective. It can however, be given a 
theoretical interpretation and justification, which we shall now address. 
 
 Assumption 2′ (Product rule) 
 Let ( , ) ( ( ) ( )).t j kP j k P U t U t= >  At any point in time t, and conditional on the agent’s 
information, the Product rule  
   ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ) ( , ),t t t t t tP j k P k r P r j P j r P r k P k j=  
holds, for any distinct , , .j k r S∈  
 
 The intuition behind the product rule goes as follows: Suppose that an individual is making 
choice from the set { , , }.j k r  Provided the choices are independent, the left hand side is the probability 
of the intransitive  chain ,j k r j    whereas the right hand side is the probability of the intransitive 
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chain ,j r k j    where   means “preferred to”. This assertion is called the Product rule. The 
Product rule can thus be interpreted as asserting that an intransitive chain in one direction is not more 
probable than an intransitive chain in another direction. One can demonstrate that the Product rule 
holds if and only if  
   
exp( ( ))
( , ) ,
exp( ( )) exp( ( ))
j
t
j k
v t
P j k
v t v t
=
+
 
for distinct , ,j k S∈  where { ( )}jv t  are deterministic terms that are unique up to an additive constant,  
see Luce and Suppes (1965, p. 350). It is well known that the binary choice probabilities can be 
rationalized by the additively separable random utility model ( ) ( ) ( ),j j jU t v t tε= +  where the random 
error terms ( ),j tε  ,j S∈  are independent with c.d.f. exp( exp( )).x− −  This result proves that under the 
Product rule the utility function admits an additively separable structure. Moreover, for binary choices 
there is no loss of generality by letting the random error terms be independent. Thus, the Product rule 
has a nice theoretical interpretation (in that departure from transitivity is random) and it implies that  
one can represent preferences by additive random utilities.3 Before we introduce the next assumption 
we need an additional definition. By stationary environment we mean that the observed covariates that 
influence the utility processes are constant over time. 
 
Assumption 3 
 In a stationary environment the utility vector process converges to a stationary process as 
time increases. 
 
 This is an intuitively plausible assumption. The reason why we require time to be large is that 
there may be possible “upstarting” effects, which may gradually fade away.  
 The axioms above have important implication which we shall discuss below.  
 
 Theorem 1 
 Assumptions 1 to 3 hold if and only if the updating equation for the utility processes 
}0),({ ≥ttU j  is given by 
(2.1)                        ( ) ( )( )( ) max ( ) , ,j j jU t U s t s W s tθ= − −  
                                                     
3 In principle, the Product rule can also be tested non-parametrically. In the present setting such testing is however not 
straight forward in the case of habit persistence and unobservables. 
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for 0 ,s t≤ <  where ( )1 2( , ) ( , ), ( , ),..., ( , )mW s t W s t W s t W s t≡  is independent of 
( )1 2( ) ( ), ( ),..., ( )mU s U s U s U s≡  and has standard multivariate type III extreme value c.d.f. given by 
(2.2)
( ) ( )1 1 2 2( , ) exp exp( ( ) ),exp( ( ) ),...,exp( ( ) ) exp( ( ) )
t
m m
s
P W s t x H w x w x w x t dτ τ τ τ θ τ ≤ = − − − − − −    
where θ  is a positive constant, ( ), 1,2,..., ,jw t j m=  are deterministic terms, 
(2.3) ( ) ( )1 2 3( ) exp , ,..., mH y y H y y y= +  , 
H is a positive decreasing function on 1mR −+ with the properties; (0,0,...,0) 0H = , 
( )2 3lim , ,..., ,mH y y y = ∞  when yj tends towards ,∞  for any j > 2 and for any real z, 
(2.4) ( ) ( )2 3 2 3, ,..., , ,...,m mH zy zy zx zH y y y=  , 
and ( )2 3, ,..., mH y y y  satisfies conditions that ensures that exp(- 2 3( , ,..., )mH y y y ) is a well defined 
multivariate c.d.f. Moreover, { ( ), }jU t t ≥ is a strictly stationary Markovian process. 
 Conversely, (2.1), (2.2) and (2.4) imply that Assumption 1 holds, (even if (2.3) does not hold). 
 
 The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Appendix A. Note that Theorem 1 states that the structure 
in (2.1), the distribution function of ( , ),W s t as well as the independence property ( , ) ( ', ')W s t W s t⊥ , 
when ( , ) ( ', ') ,s t s t∩ = ∅ are implied by Assumptions 1 to 3. This is indeed remarkable and far from 
intuitive. 
 The term θ  may be interpreted as a preference discount factor. This parameter plays a crucial 
role in the developments below because it is a key determinant of habit persistence, to be discussed 
further below. We note that a particular multivariate type III extreme value distribution function plays 
a major role here.4 This distribution is well known within the theory of discrete choice and it implies 
the so-called GEV model (Generalized Extreme Value), see McFadden (1978). As regards conditions 
that ensure that exp(- 2 3( , ,..., )mH y y y ) is a multivariate c.d.f. we also refer to McFadden (1978). By 
standard multivariate type III extreme value distribution we mean that the corresponding marginal 
distributions are equal to exp( exp( )).x− −  
 The next result follows readily from Theorem 1.  
                                                     
4 McFadden (1978) calls this distribution the Generalized Extreme Value distribution. 
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 Corollary 1 
 Assume that time is discrete. Then under the assumption of Theorem 1 the utility functions 
have the structure, 
(2.5)            ( )( )( ) max 1 , ( ) ( )j j j jU t U t w t tθ η= − − +  
where 1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( )),mt t t tη η η η= t = 1, 2, …, are independent and independent of the deterministic 
terms, { ( )}jw t , and has standard multivariate type III extreme value distributed given by 
(2.6)  ( ) ( )( )1 2( ) exp exp( ),exp( ),...,exp( ) ,mP t x H x x xη ≤ = − − − −  
where the function H satisfies (2.3) and (2.4) and necessary conditions for the right side of (2.6) to be 
a multivariate c.d.f., with one- dimensional univariate marginal distributions equal to 5  
(2.7)                   ( ) ( )( )( ) exp expjP t x xη ≤ = − − . 
 
 The proof of Corollary 1 is given in the appendix. 
  A stochastic process with the property (2.2), and with 0,θ = is called an extremal process in 
probability theory, see for example Resnick (1987). We shall call the process that satisfies (2.2) with  
0θ ≥ , a modified extremal process. Thus, the modification consists in allowing for preference 
depreciation represented by θ. Usually, in the absence of state dependence effects, the deterministic 
terms { ( )}jw t  depend on time through time-dependent covariates. When θ is large there would be no 
dependence on the past and in this case, so that in this case ( ) ( ) ( ).j j jU t w t tη= +  If we drop Axiom 3 
then we may also allow θ  to be equal to zero. Note also that in the stationary case ( )jw t does not 
depend on t. 
 The extremal processes belong to a more general class of stochastic processes called max-
stable processes. Max-stable processes have the property that they allow one to apply the maximum 
operation without “leaving the class”. That is, the maximum of independent max-stable processes is 
also a max-stable process. This is analogous to the class of Gaussian processes, which is closed under 
aggregation. The class of modified extremal processes is also closed under the maximum operation. 
The modified extremal process is, possibly apart from deterministic depreciation, a pure jump 
stochastic process. In our context this means that the “current” utility has the role of an “anchoring” 
level such that unless the values of new stimuli exceed the anchoring level, utility will not be updated. 
The deterministic depreciation means that the “anchoring” effect at a given point in time gradually 
                                                     
5 There seems to be some confusion in the statistical literature as regards notation. What some authors call type III extreme 
value distributions, others call type I. Here we have adopted the convention of Resnick (1987). 
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fades away as time passes. This interpretation is consistent with results from psychological research 
where it is typically found that individuals do respond to stimuli only if they are sufficiently strong. In 
fact, representations similar to (2.1) or (2.5) have a long history in psychology and measurement 
theory and stem from empirical evidence indicating that individuals seem not to react to stimuli unless 
their intensity exceeds some sensory threshold. This notion of sensory threshold was introduced by the 
philosopher Herbart (1824), see Gescheider (1997). In the present case this means that habit 
persistence can be interpreted as a setting where the agent does not pay attention to some “stimuli”, 
unless the stimuli exceed some threshold determined by previous utility evaluations. Thus, with this 
interpretation, if ( ) ( ) ( 1) ,j j jw t t U tη θ+ ≤ − −  the agent will not react to the new stimulus and, 
accordingly, will not update her or his preferences (apart from depreciation). This interpretation is 
similar to Fechner's (1860/1966) notion of “just noticeable differences” (jnd). The moments of time 
updating occurs may not necessarily relate to actual events, but could be due to sudden glimpses of 
“insight” at which epochs it is realized that utility re-evaluations are needed because the value enjoyed 
from the respective states is not the same as it used to be. Re-evaluations may of course also happen 
due to unanticipated information that arrives. The special case with θ = 0, corresponds to the situation 
in which the agent has “perfect” memory and fixed tastes in the sense that previous preference 
evaluations and tastes are retained perfectly fixed in the agents mind. Unless some of the systematic 
utility components changes, there will be no change of state in this case. The case with positive θ  
corresponds to the case with “imperfect” memory in the sense that previous utility evaluations are 
depreciated and, as a result, the current arriving stimulus will be taken into account provided  
( ) ( ) ( 1) .j j jw t t U tη θ+ > − −  
Although this and similar interpretations are interesting, they are by no means crucial for the 
theoretical justification of our approach. It is sufficient for the rationale of our approach to rely on the 
intuition of Assumption 1. 
 Note that it follows from Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 that the utilities at any point in time are 
multivariate extreme value distributed. To realize this, consider for simplicity the discrete time case in 
which 
(2.8)  ( )0( ) max ( ) ( ) ( ) ,tU t w tτ τ η τ τ θ≤ ≤= + − −  
which by Corollary 1 implies that the c.d.f. of U(t) has the form  
(2.9)  ( ) ( )( )
0
( ) exp exp( ( ) ) ,
t
tP U t x e H w xτ θ
τ
τ− −
=
 ≤ = − −    
where 1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( )),mw w w wτ τ τ τ=  1 2( , ,..., )mx x x x=  and  
    ( )1 1 2 2(exp( ( ) ))) exp( ( ) ),exp( ( ) ),...,exp( ( ) ) .m mH w x H w x w x w xτ τ τ τ− = − − −  
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Clearly, the expression in (2.9) is also a multivariate extreme value distribution as is easily verified. 
The corresponding choice probabilities for being in a state at any given point in time follows by using 
the familiar formula for GEV choice probabilities, see McFadden (1978). 
3. Implications for the choice probabilities in continuous time  
3.1. Time-invariant choice sets  
We shall now explore the implications from the theory above for the structure of the choice 
probabilities in the case where the choice set does not change over time, and where potential 
unobservable known to the agent are given. For my R+∈ we define ( ),
BH y  obtained from ( ),H y  by 
setting 0jy =  when .j B∉  (cf. McFadden, 1978). 
  
 Theorem 2 
 Under the assumptions of Theorem 1 it follows that { }( ), 0J t t >  is a Markov chain. The 
corresponding transition-and state probabilities, { ( , )}ijQ s t  and { ( )},jP t  can be expressed as 
(3.1)   ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ), ( ) ( ) ,
( )
j j
ij
k
k B
V t V s
Q s t P J t j J s i
V t
∈
−
= = = =   
for , 1,2,..., , , ,s j j m i j j B< = ≠ ∈  
(3.2)    ( ) ( )
\{ }
, 1 ,ii ik
k B i
Q s t Q s t
∈
= −   
and 
(3.3)                                             ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ,
( )
j
j
k
k B
V t
P t P J t j
V t
∈
= = =   
where 
(3.4)  ( )
0
( ) exp( ( ) ) exp( ( ) )) exp( ( )) ,
t
B
j j j j jV t EU t t w H w d cθ τ θτ τ τ= + = + +  
and where jc is a positive parameter that captures the value of being in state j at time zero 
and BjH denotes the partial derivative with respect to component j .  
 
 The proof of Theorem 2 follows from Dagsvik (1988), see Appendix A for details. Resnick 
and Roy (1990) has extended the result of Theorem 2 to the case where the joint p.d.f. of 
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2 3( ) ( ( ), ( ),..., ( )),mU t U t U t U t=  at each given point in time t, does not necessarily exist. This means that 
the function H(y) is not necessarily jointly differentiable. 
 Recall that the terms { ( ), 0},jw t t ≥  which are treated as deterministic in this section, may 
depend on variables that are known to the agent by unobserved to the researcher. As mentioned above, 
the parameter θ  is closely linked to the serial dependence of the utility processes, see Dagsvik (2002). 
One can show that 
(3.5)                            ( )
( )
max ( ),max ( ) ,
( )
k
k B
k B k k B k
k
k B
V s
Corr U s U t
V t
ζ ∈∈ ∈
∈
  
=    

  
where the function [ ]( ), 0,1∈x xζ , is given by Tiago de Oliveira (1973), and equals 
(3.6)                                          
x
2
0
6 log z( ) dz
1 z
xζ = −
π − . 
It can be shown that ( )xζ  is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,1] with (0) 0=ζ  and (1) 1=ζ . 
Alternatively, one can also show that (Resnick and Roy, 1990), 
(3.7)  ( )
( )
exp( max ( )),exp( max ( )) .
( )
k
k B
k B k k B k
k
k B
V s
Corr U s U t
V t
∈
∈ ∈
∈
− − =

  
As measures of dependence the expressions in (3.5) and (3.7) are equivalent since they differ only by a 
strictly increasing transformation. From (3.4) it follows that when ( ) / ( ) 0,k kk B k BV s V t∈ ∈ →   then   
Hence, the corresponding autocorrelation in (3.5) and (3.7) tend towards zero in this case, such that in 
the limit there is no serial correlation in tastes. It follows readily from Theorem 2 that in this case 
( , ) ( )ij jQ s t P t=  where  
(3.8)  
( )
( )
exp( ( )) exp( ( ))
( ) .
exp( ( )) exp( ( ))
B
j j
j B
k k
k B
w t H w t
P t
w t H w t
∈
=   
The expression in (3.8) is the familiar formula for the choice probabilities of the GEV family, see 
McFadden (1978). In the other extreme case when 0,θ → then ( ) / ( ) 1k kk B k BV s V t∈ ∈ <   for ,s t<  
and finite for t, but as t tends towards infinity this ratio tends towards 1, which corresponds to perfect 
serial dependence in tastes. 
 From Theorem 2 we see that an important implication of (modified) extremal utility processes 
is that that the choice process { ( ), 0}J t t >  is a Markov chain in continuous time (this holds in the 
general case with non-stationarity). Thus, in the “reference” case with no state dependence effects 
Axiom 2 provides a theoretical motivation for assuming the Markov property. In addition, 
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Assumptions 1 to 3 imply a particular structure of the transition- and state probabilities, as expressed 
in (3.1) to (3.4).  
 The next result follows immediately from Theorem 1. 
 
 Corollary 2 
 Suppose that S contains at least three alternatives. When the choice set contains more than 
two alternatives it follows from Theorem 1 that the choice probability given a transition equals 
(3.9)                  
( )
( )
\{ } \{ }
( ) exp( ( )) exp( ( ))
( )
( ) exp( ( )) exp( ( ))
B
j j j
ij B
k k k
k B i k B i
V t w t H w t
t
V t w t H w t
π
∈ ∈
′
= =
′  . 
 
 We recognize the formula in (3.9) as a GEV choice model, that is, the choice probability that 
follows from maximizing a utility function of the form ( ) ( ),j jw t tη+  subject to the choice set \ { },B i  
where  1 2( ( ), ( ),...)t tη η  are multivariate extreme value distributed.  
 From Corollary 2 it follows moreover that for 
 
 Corollary 3 
 Suppose that S contains at least three alternatives. Under the assumptions of Theorem 1 the 
transition probabilities { ( , )}ijQ s t of the Markov chain { }( ), 0J t t > have the property that 
( , ) ( , ),ij rjQ s t Q s t= when , , .i r i j r j≠ ≠ ≠  
 
 The result in Corollary 3 is rather intriguing: It asserts that under the absence of state 
dependence, the transitions to a new state are stochastically independent of the state of origin. Thus, 
this property is in fact a characterization of the reference case of no state dependence. 
 Next we shall consider the corresponding transition intensities. Recall that the two state case 
the hazard rates of a continuous time Markov chain are defined (usually) as                         
          
( , )
( ) lim ijij s t
Q s t
q t
t s→
=
−
,  
for .i j≠  
 
 Corollary 4 
 Let ( )iT s  be the duration of stay in state i, given that state i was entered at time s. Under the 
conditions of Theorem 1 the transition intensities of the Markov chain { }( ), 0J t t >  are given by 
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(3.10)   
( )( ) exp( ( )) exp( ( ))
( ) ,
( ) ( )
B
j j j
ij
k k
k B k B
V t w t H w t
q t
V t V t
∈ ∈
′
= =   
for ,i j≠ ,j B∈  and 
(3.11)   
\{ }
( ) ( ).ii ik
k B i
q t q t
∈
=   
Furthermore, 
(3.12)   ( )( ) exp ( ) .
s y
i ii
s
P T s y q dτ τ
+ 
> = −     
 
 The intensity ( )iiq t  is the hazard function (hazard rate) at time t. The formula in (3.12) for the 
duration c.d.f. can be simplified a bit. For notational simplicity, write 
    ( ) ( ).k
k B
V t V t
∈
=  
With this notation we can express the hazard function as 
(3.13)    ( ) ( )( ) .
( )
i
ii
V t V tq t
V t
′ ′
−
=  
When the expression in (3.13) is inserted into (3.12) we obtain that 
   ( ) ( )( )( ) exp .
( ) ( )
s y
i
i
s
VV sP T s y d
V s y V
τ
τ
τ
+ ′ > =  +    
Example 3.1 
In this example we consider a choice setting with 3 alternatives, i.e., S = {1,2,3}. The error terms of 
the utilities of alternatives 2 and 3 are allowed to be correlated. To this end we assume that the joint 
c.d.f. of the error terms of the increment of utility function, 1 2 3( ), ( ), ( )),t t tη η η(   is given by 
  31 2 //1 1 2 2 3 3( , , ) exp( ( ) ),
xx xP x x x e e eη η η − ρ− − ρ ρ≤ ≤ ≤ = − − +  
where (0,1].ρ ∈  This specification implies that  
    22 3( , ) 1 ,corr = −ε ε ρ  
and 
                        31 2 //( ) ( ) .xx xH x e e e ρρ ρ= + +  
Hence, it follows that 
  1 1 1
0
( ) exp( ( ) ) ,
t
V t w cθ= τ + τ +   1 1( ) exp( ( ) ),V t w t tθ′ = +  
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  ( ) 12 3
0
( ) exp( ( ) / exp( ( ) / exp( ( ) / ) ,
t
j j jV t e w w w d c
ρρ ρ ρ−θτ= τ + τ τ τ +  
and 
  ( ) 12 3exp( ( ) / exp( ( ) / exp( ( ) / ),( ) t jjV e w t w t w tt ρρ ρ ρ−θ′ +=  
 
for j = 2, 3. The corresponding transition intensities now follow by inserting the expressions above in 
(3.10). Similarly, the distribution of the holding times in the respective states follows from (3.11). 
 
Corollary 5 
 In the special case where the utility processes are independent Theorem 2 implies that 
   ( )
0
( ) exp ( ) .
t
j j jV t w d cτ τθ τ= + +  
Furthermore, if B contains at least three alternatives, the choice probabilities, given transition out of 
the state occupied reduces to 
(3.14) ( )
\{ }
exp( ( ))
( ) ( ) | ( ) , ( ) ( )
exp( ( ))
j
ij
k
k B i
w t
t P J t j J t i J t J t
w t
π
∈
≡ = − = ≠ − =  . 
  
 We note that the conditional transition probability in Corollary 5, satisfies the IIA property, 
see Luce (1959). From Corollary 5 the following result follows immediately: 
 
 Corollary 6 
 Under the conditions of Corollary 5 the transition intensities of the Markov chain { }( ), 0J t t >  
are given by 
(3.15)   
( )
( )( )
0
exp ( )
( )
exp ( )
j
ij t
t
k k
k B
w t
q t
w t d e cθτ τ θ τ −
∈
=  
− − +   
, 
for ,i j≠  and for i j= , 
(3.16)   
\{ }
( ) ( )ii ik
k B i
q t q t
∈
=  . 
 The corresponding transition probabilities and the unconditional choice probabilities are 
given by 
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(3.17)   
0
( , ) ,
exp( ( ) ( ) )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
ij
k B
t
j
s
t
t
k k
Q s t
w t d
w t d e cθ
τ τ θ τ
τ τ θ τ
∈
−
=
− −
 
− − +  


 
for ,i j≠  and  
(3.18)   0
0
( )
exp( ( ) ( ) )
.
exp( ( ) ( ) )
j
k B
t
t
j j
t
t
k k
P t
w t d e c
w t d e c
θ
θ
τ τ θ τ
τ τ θ τ
∈
−
−
=
− − +
 
− − +  


 
  
 In Appendix B we have outlined how the transition probabilities and intensities look like in 
the case where the deterministic functions { ( )}jw t  are step functions that only changes at discrete time 
periods. In the case with independent utility processes across alternatives and with time independent 
systematic utility components { ( )},jw t  and 0,jc =  for all j, the result of Corollary 6 reduces to 
(3.19)   
( )
( )
1
exp
( )
exp
j
j j m
k
k
w
P t P
w
=
= =

 
and 
(3.20)   ( ) ( )( )1 exp,
1 exp( )ij j
t s
Q s t P
t
θ
θ
− − −
= ⋅
− −
 
for s t< , ,i j≠  and 
(3.21)   
( )( ) ( )
( )
( )( )
( )
exp exp 1 exp
( , )
1 exp 1 expii i
t s t t s
Q s t P
t t
θ θ θ
θ θ
− − − − − − −
= + ⋅
− − − −
. 
The autocorrelation function in this case reduces to 
(3.22)   ( ) ( )( )( )
1 exp
( ), ( ) 1
1 expj j
t s
Corr U s U t
t
θζ
θ
 
− − −
= −  
− − 
. 
The corresponding transition intensities are given by 
(3.23) ( )( ) 1 exp
j
i
P
q t
t
θ
θ
=
− −
. 
From (3.19) to (3.23) we see that the transition probabilities and intensities become stationary when tθ 
is large. However, when tθ is small this is not so. In fact, the transition probabilities and intensities 
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increase by the factor 1 (1 exp( ))tθ− −  when tθ  is small. The interpretation is that when the agent is 
very “young” the choice history is very short and therefore the effect of habit persistence is weak. As 
the agent grows older this “upstarting” effect disappears gradually, and becomes negligible when 
exp( )tθ−  is close to zero. This is also seen from the autocorrelation function in (3.22). When tθ  is 
large, the autocorrelation function is, apart from a strictly increasing transformation, equal to 
exp( )tθ− . However, when tθ  is “small” the autocorrelation is influenced by the term 
1 (1 exp( ))tθ− −  in such a way that it becomes weaker when t decreases. Consider the special case 
when θ  is close to zero. Then (3.20) and (3.21) are approximately equal to 
    ( , )ij j
t sQ s t P
t
−
= ⋅ , 
for ,i j≠  and 
                                                   ( , ) .ii i
s t sQ s t P
t t
−
= + ⋅  
In this case the autocorrelation function becomes,             
                            ( ) ( )max ( ), max ( ) 1k k k k t ssCorr U s U t t tζ ζ
 −  
= = −     
. 
Thus, when time is large there are no transitions in this case. However, when t is “small” the 
autocorrelation will be less than 1 which means that in the beginning the effect of habit persistence is 
reduced because the choice history is short. 
 In the special case where ( )jw t  does not depend on t and t is large the transition probabilities 
and intensities reduce to  
(3.24)        ( ) ( )( )( ), 1 expij jQ s t P t s θ= − − −  
for s t< , i j≠ , and 
(3.25)        ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( ), exp 1 expii iQ s t t s P t sθ θ= − − + − − − . 
The corresponding transition intensities, for ,i j≠  are given by 
(3.26) ( ) =ij jq t Pθ . 
 The depreciation effect represented by the parameter θ can in fact be given an interesting 
interpretation, which we shall now explain. In fact, one can interpret the depreciation mechanism as a 
stochastic device where the habit persistence effect is represented by means of a particular Poisson 
process. The intuition is that, at independent random points Zk in time, 1,2,...k = , (random to the 
observer), the agent forgets, or stops, caring about previous evaluations and only takes into account 
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and new stimuli. That is, if for some k, 1k kZ t Z− < < , the agent will, at time t, only take into account 
previous preference evaluations within the interval ( ]1, .kZ t−  The intensity of this process is θ, which 
means that the probability that for some k, ( , )kZ t t dt∈ +  equals θdt. If the agent does care, he will 
keep the previous value without depreciation. Consider now (3.24). Since no explanatory variable 
change over time, the agent will never change to a new alternative unless he stops taking the past into 
account. Specifically, to change state from time s to time t the agent must stop taking into account 
previous evaluations of the alternatives at some time in the interval ( , ).s t  Since the interval between 
two events in a Poisson process is exponentially distributed with θ  as parameter, the probability that 
this will happen is 1 exp( ( ) ).t s θ− − −  The conditional probability that the agent shall choose 
alternative j, given that he stops caring about the past, equals Pj, since the corresponding utilities that 
govern this choice are ( ),j j jU w tη= +  where ( ), 1, 2,...,j t j mη = , are independent extreme value 
distributed as in (2.7). Hence, by multiplying Pj  by the probability that the agent will begin to neglect 
the past some time within ( , ),s t  (3.24) is obtained. Similarly, if the agent occupies state i at time s he 
will continue to be in state i at time t if the agent cares about past preference evaluations (which has 
probability equal to exp( ( )),t sθ− −  or if the agent does not care about past evaluations (with 
probability )))(exp(1 st −−− θ  but chooses state i with probability Pi. Hence, (3.25) follows. Eq. 
(3.26) asserts that the intensity of a transition from i to j can happen when the agent stops taking the 
past into account in ( ),t t dt+ , which happens with probability θdt. Given that he forgets about the 
past he will go to state j with probability Pj. Hence, we obtain that the probability of going from state i 
to j in ( ), +t t dt  equals θdtPj. 
 Let us compare the structure of the preferences and their implications obtained above with a 
formulation based on a multiperiod Probit framework. For simplicity we shall only consider the binary 
case. To this end assume that 
(3.27)   ( )( ) 1 ( ) ( )j j j jU t U t w t tρ η= − + +  
where ( ), 1,2, 1,2,...j t j tη = = , are i.i. normally distributed random variables with variance equal to 
1/2. The structure in (3.27) is analogous to the extremal process given in (2.5). In particular, both 
representations have the Markov property. It follows easily that 
(3.28)  ( ) ( ) ( )( )22 1 2 12( 1)1( ) ( ) 1 kt k tP U t U t w t k w t k
ρ ρ
ρ + ≤
 
−  
> = Φ − − −   
−   
 . 
Not surprisingly, the structure in (3.28) is similar to the one obtained in Corollary 6 for the binary 
case. The corresponding transition probabilities cannot, however, be expressed on closed form. The 
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multiperiod probit setting with utility as in (3.27) has been discussed by Heckman (1981a, section 
3.10). 
 Although the specification in (3.27) and the choice probability in (3.28) are analogous to (2.5) 
and (3.18) the implications for the choice process over time are qualitatively different. Whereas the 
extremal process representation of the utility processes that follows from Assumptions 1 to 3 yields a 
Markovian choice process, the first order autoregressive Gaussian process representation in (3.27) 
does not imply a Markovian choice process. However, the most important weakness of the multiperiod 
Probit model is the lack of choice theoretic rationale for the model structure (in the reference case). 
 
4. Non-decreasing choice sets 
Here, we shall consider the situation with time varying choice sets. In general, this case is 
more complicated and we shall limit our treatment to the case in which the utility processes are  
independent across alternatives and where the choice sets, { ( ), 0}B t t >  are non-decreasing, which  
means that ( ) ( ),B s B t⊆ whenever  s < t. We have the following result. 
 
 Theorem 3 
 Assume that ( ) ( ),B s B t⊆ whenever s < t and that the alternative-specific utility processes 
are independent across alternatives.  Then the choice process { ( ), 0}J t t >  is a  
Markov chain with transition- and state probabilities given by  
      ( ) ( )
( )
( ) ( ( )) ( )
, ( ) ( ) ,
( )
j j j
ij
k
k B t
V t B s V s
Q s t P J t j J s i
V t
δ
∈
−
= = = =   
for , 1,2,..., , , ( ), ( ),s j j m i j i B s j B t< = ≠ ∈ ∈  
                     ( ) ( )
( )\{ }
, 1 ,ii ik
k B t i
Q s t Q s t
∈
= −  . 
and 
            ( )
( )
( )
( ) ( ) ,
( )
j
j
k
k B t
V t
P t P J t j
V t
∈
= = =   
where ( ) 1,k Bδ = if k belongs to the set B and zero otherwise, and 
            
0
( ) exp( ( ) ) .
t
j j jV t w d cτ θτ τ= + +  
  
 Theorem 3 is proved in Appendix A. From Theorem 3 the next result is immediate; 
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 Corollary 7 
 If ( ) \ ( ),j B t B s∈  then  
(4.1)                            ( )( ) ( ) ( ( ) ).P J t j J s P J t j= = =  
 
The result of Corollary 7 asserts that the choice of “new” alternatives, that is, alternatives 
that are available at the current time epoch but were not available previously, is independent of  
previous choices.  
 Dagsvik (2002) postulated (4.1) as an axiom that should hold in the absence of structural  
state dependence, and he called it an Intertemporal version of the Independence from Irrelevant  
Alternatives, property (IIIA). He also proved that when the utilities { ( ), 0},jU t t ≥  j =1, 2,…, are  
independent max-stable processes then (4.1) implies that the utilities are Extremal processes.  
Consequently, Corollary 7 follows in this case.  
 Unfortunately, the case with general time varying choice sets is rather complicated, and will  
be discussed elsewhere.  
5. Structural state dependence 
In the analysis of panel data it is often noted that individuals who have experienced an event in the 
past are more likely to experience the event in the future than are individuals who have not 
experienced the event. Recall that there are two explanations of this: One explanation is that as a 
consequence of experiencing the event preferences and choice restrictions are altered. If so, otherwise 
identical individuals who did experience the event would behave differently in the future than 
individuals who did not experience the event. In this case choice experience has a genuine behavioral 
effect that give rise to so-called true state dependence. Another explanation is that preference and 
choice constraints differ across individuals in an unmeasured way. This implies that previous and 
future choices will be correlated, since choices represent information about temporally persistent 
unobservables that affect choices. Thus, this case yields so-called spurious state dependence,  
(Heckman, 1981a,b). As Heckman has emphasized in several papers, one cannot without a priori 
theoretical restrictions separate spurious from true state dependence. In other words, this identification 
problem cannot be settled by statistical methods alone (see for example Heckman, 1991).  
 In this case the structural part of the utility function becomes endogenous and it is far from 
evident how the corresponding choice probabilities should be specified in this case.  
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 Suppose initially that no state dependence were present such that preferences were exogenous 
and Assumption 1 to 3 hold. Then the utility representation in (2.5) holds. Now suppose that 
preferences may be affected by choice behavior. This means that either the systematic terms { ( )}jw t  
or the distribution of the random error terms { ( )},j tη  or both, are influence by choice behavior. Let 
( ) { ( ), }h t J s s t= <  denote the choice history prior to time t and let ( , ( ))jw t h t  and ( ( ))h tθ  denote the 
structural term of utility of alternative j and habit persistence parameter, respectively, modified by the 
choice history. 
 
 Assumption 4 
 Under structural state dependence the utility function is updated according to  
                ( , ( )) max( ( 1, ( 1)) ( ( )), ( , ( )) ( ))j j j jU t h t U t h t h t w t h t tθ η= − − − +  
where the vectors ( ), 1,2,...,t tη = are independent of the choice history, and with distributional 
properties as in Theorem 1. 
 
 Assumption 4 asserts that when the effect of previous choice experience is properly accounted 
for, in the sense that possible behavioral effects on the parameters of the utility function have been 
incorporated, then there is no interdependence between the current and future indirect utility and 
previous choices. The motivation for this is analogous to the justification of Assumption 1. Indeed, if 
this were not true it would signify that not all the relevant information about the value of the 
alternatives has been accounted for in the utility index. In other words, in this case the indirect utility 
would be ill defined since it fails to capture all information relevant for the agent's choice behavior. 
 The next result is an implication of Assumption 4. 
  
 Theorem 4 
 Assume that Assumptions 1 to 4 hold. Then the discrete time version of the transition 
probabilities hold with { ( ), }jw s s t< replaced by the corresponding experience dependent terms, 
{ ( , ( )), }.jw s h s s t<  
 
 The proof of Theorem 4 is given in Appendix A. 
The result of Theorem 4 means that one can introduce previous choice variables into the transition 
probabilities or transition intensities as if they were exogenous. However, the nice formula for the 
probability of being in a particular state will no longer hold. 
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6. Identification and conditional estimation  
In this section we shall discuss identification. In particular, we shall consider identification in three 
separate cases, namely the case with fixed effects, random effects and the case with neither random 
nor fixed effects. For simplicity, we assume throughout this section that the choice sets are constant 
over time and that the utility processes are independent over alternatives. In general, it may not be 
possible to represent the unobservables (known to the agent) by random or fixed effects because they 
may not be constant over time. The more general case with non-constant unobservables will not be 
discussed here.  
 
6.1. Identification in the absence of unobservables that are perfectly known 
to the agent. 
 
In this subsection we shall discuss identification in the basic case where there are no unobservables 
that are perfectly known by the agent. In particular, we shall show that given the transition intensities 
the respective partial derivatives of the H function can be recovered. For simplicity, the next result is 
given only for the case with exogenous preferences (no state dependence), although it is possible to 
extend the result to accommodate state dependence. 
 
 Corollary 8 
 Let A be any proper subset of the choice set B. Under the assumptions of Theorem 2 it follows, 
for \ , ,i B A j A∈ ∈  that 
(6.1)  ( )
\
log ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
t t
B
k ik jk
k B k A k B Ad d
H w e d c t q x q x dxθττ τ θ κ
∈ ∈ ∈
   
+ + = + +          
and 
(6.2)     ( )
\
log exp( ( )) ( ) log ( ) ( ) ( ) ,
t
B
j j ij ik jk
k A k B Ad
H w t w t t q t q x q x dxθ κ
∈ ∈
 
+ + = + + +     
where 0d ≥  and κ  are arbitrary constants. 
 
 The proof of Corollary 8 is given in appendix A. 
 Corollary 8 shows that (exp( ( )))exp( ( ) )Bj jH w t w t tθ+  is non-parametrically identified up to 
an arbitrary multiplicative constant, .κ  This constant is irrelevant because it cancels in the choice 
model. In particular (6.2) implies that 
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(6.3)  1 1 1
\
( ) log ( ) ( ) ( ) .
t
i ik k
k A k B Ad
w t t q t q x q x dxθ κ
∈ ∈
 
+ = + + +     
From the transition intensities we have that 
(6.4)  ( ) 1 1log exp( ( )) ( ) ( ) log ( ) log ( )Bj j ij iH w t w t w t q t q t+ − = −  
for ,1.i j≠  The relation in (6.4) are analogous to the corresponding identifying relations between the 
utility structure and the choice probabilities in the GEV model. Under suitable restrictions the 
structural terms { ( )}jw t  can be identified. Consequently, (6.3) implies that θ is identified. 
 Consider the particular case with only two alternatives and with utility processes that are 
independent across alternatives. In this case (6.3) reduces to 
(6.5)   ( )1 21 12 21( ) log ( ) ( ) ( )
t
d
w t t q t q x q x dxθ κ+ = + + +  
and 
(6.6)   ( )2 12 12 21( ) log ( ) ( ) ( )
t
d
w t t q t q x q x dxθ κ+ = + + + . 
In contrast to the case with more than two alternatives, there are only two transition intensities in the 
binary case. Thus for any pair of intensity functions 12 21( ), ( )q t q t  we can find a pair 1( )w t  and 2 ( )w t  
determined by (6.5) and (6.6). In other words, this implies that any Markov chain with two states has 
an independent Extremal process utility representation. We summarize this property in the corollary 
below. 
 
 Corollary 9 
 A Markov chain in continuous time with two states always admits an independent Extremal 
utility process representation. 
 
6.2. Identification with additive fixed effects and state 
dependence 
 
We assume in this section that the random error terms of the utility functions are independent across 
alternatives and that the respective structural terms contain fixed- or random effects. Consider first the 
case with fixed effects and assume that  
(6.7)   ( , ( )) ( , ( )),j j jw t h t w t h tμ= +   
where jμ  and ( , ( )),jw t h t  j = 1,2,…, are, respectively, fixed effects and deterministic functions of 
individual characteristics and alternative-specific attributes that are assumed known apart from a set of 
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parameters to be estimated. In general, the structural terms { ( , ( ))}jw t h t  may depend on choice 
experience through h(t). We normalize by letting 1 0.μ =  From Corollary 6 it now follows 
immediately that  
(6.8)    1 1 1
1
( , ( )) ( , ( ))
log ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , ( )),
( , ( )) ( , ( ))
ij i
j j
i ij
q t h t q s h s
w t h t w t h t w s h s w s h s
q t h t q s h s
 
= − + −   
     
for ,1,i j≠  and 1.j ≠  Eq. (6.8) demonstrates that when covariates change over time one is able to 
identify   
   1 1( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , ( )) ( , ( )).j jw s h s w s h s w t h t w t h t− + −     
If, for example, ( , ( )) ( , ( ))j jw t h t Z t h t β=  where { ( , ( ))}jZ t h t  are K-dimensional attribute vectors that 
also may be individual-specific, and possibly modified by choice experience. This implies that  
(6.9)  1 1 1 1
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )) .
K
j j k jk jk k k
k
w s w s w t w t Z s Z s Z t Z t β
=
− + − = − + −     
Thus, with standard conditions on the matrix 1 1{ ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )},k jk jk kZ s Z s Z t Z t− + −  it follows that the 
parameter vector β  is identified. 
 
6.3. Conditional likelihood estimation with fixed and random effects 
Assume now that there is no state dependence. Thus (6.7) reduces to ( ) ( ),j j jw t w tμ= +   where jμ  is a 
fixed or random effect. Consider for simplicity the case with discrete time and let ( )ijq t  be the one 
step transition probabilities from time t-1 to t. Chamberlain (1980) and Lee (2002) have demonstrated 
that one can form a particular conditional likelihood function in multinomial logit models where the 
fixed effects are eliminated. The duration model we have analyzed in this paper has a similar property. 
Specifically, it follows that 
(6.10)      1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
( 1) ( ) 1
.
( 1) ( ) ( 1) ( ) 1 exp( ( 1) ( 1) ( ) ( ))
j j
j j j j j j
q t q t
q t q t q t q t w t w t w t w t
−
=
− + − + − − − + −   
 
The expression in (6.10) is the conditional likelihood of transitions from state 1 at time t-2 to state j at 
time t-1 and further back to state 1 at time t, given that transitions occur either from state i to state j, or 
vice versa. Thus, similarly to Chamberlain’s conditional likelihood method and the results above 
imply the potential of developing a similar conditional likelihood method for estimating the structure 
of { ( )}jw t  in a similar way as Honoré and Kyriazidou (2000). Unfortunately, in the presence of state 
dependence one cannot apply this method. 
 Consider next the analogous case with random effects. Let 
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(6.11)    
exp( ( , ( )))
( , ( ) | ) ,
( , ( ) | )
j j
ij t
w t h t
q t h t
V t h t e θ
μ
μ
μ −
+
=

 
where 1 2( , ,...}μ μ μ=  and 
   
0
( , ( ) | ) exp( ( , ( )) ) .
t
k k k
k
V t h t w h d cμ μ τ τ τθ τ = + + +      
From (6.11) it follows that the unconditional transition probability of going from state i at time t-2 to 
state j at time t-1 and back to state i at time t, ,i j≠  is equal to 
  ( ) (2 1)exp( )( 1| ) ( | ) exp( ( 1) ( )) ,( 1| ) ( | )i jij ji j i tE q t q t w t w t E V t V t e θ
μ μμ μ
μ μ − −
+ 
− = − +  
− 
   
which implies that 
(6.12)  
( )
( ) ( ) 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1
1 exp( ( 1) ( 1) ( ) ( ))
( 1| ) ( | )
.
( 1| ) ( | ) ( 1| ) ( | ) j j
j j
j j j j w t w t w t w t
E q t q t
E q t q t E q t q t
μ μ
μ μ μ μ + − − − + −
−
=
− + −    
 
Similarly to the case with fixed effects, the expression in (6.12) is the conditional likelihood of 
transitions between state 1 and state j, given that transitions occur  between state 1 to state j, or vice 
versa. Thus, also in the case with random effect it is possible to apply a conditional likelihood method 
for the estimation of { ( )}jw t that does not depend on the postulated distribution of the random effects. 
This is clearly a great advantage since it is hard to justify a priori the class of distributions of the 
random effects. 
 
7. Further Examples 
In this section we shall briefly discuss how the stochastic framework developed in this paper might be 
applied in concrete cases.  
 
7.1. Labor Supply and Sectoral mobility in a static setting  
In this example the issue is to analyze panel data on sectoral mobility when one allows for habit 
persistence. The agent is assumed to have the choice between different sectors in the labor market. 
Each sector has fixed (sector-specific) hours of work and wage. Let tjz  denote the wage at time period 
t (discrete time) of sector j. There are no transaction costs and the agent chooses to be in the state that 
maximizes utility. Assume that the utility of working in sector j at t, with disposable income C and 
workload h, has the structure ( , ) ( ),t j ju C h tγ ε+ +  where { ( )}j tε are random error terms, ( , )tu C h  is a 
deterministic term that captures the representative utility of disposable income C and hours of work h, 
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and jγ is a deterministic term that captures the representative utility of the tasks to be performed in 
occupation j, ceteris paribus. For sector j hours of work is fixed and equal to .jh  Given sector j, the 
budget constraint is given by ( , ),tj jf z h IC =  where I is non-labor income and f is the function that 
transforms gross income tj jz h I+ to disposable income. Let 
(7.1)    ( ) ( ( , ), ) .j t tj j j j jw t u f z h I h γ= +  
Thus, in the absence of taste persistence we interpret ( ) ( )j jw t tη+  is the conditional indirect utility 
function at time t, given alternative j. The term ( )jw t is the period-specific representative utility of 
occupation j at time t. The term jγ  could be specified as a function of non-pecuniary and sector-
specific attributes. It could also be treated as fixed or random effect. If we allow for habit persistence 
and invoke Assumptions 1 to 3 it follows from Corollary 1 that the utility function is given by 
(7.2)   ( ) max( ( 1) , ( ) ( )),j j j jU t U t w t tθ η= − − +  
where the vector 1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ),...)t t tη η η=  is serially independent and multivariate extreme value 
distributed. The probabilities for going from one occupation to another one, and the probability of 
working in a particular occupation are now given by the formulas in Theorem 2 or Corollary 6 in the 
case with independent utilities. If jγ is a fixed or random effect one could in fact estimate the model 
by the method suggested in sections 6.1 and 6.2. 
 
7.2. Labor supply and sectoral mobility in a life cycle setting  
 
In this section we shall discuss the modeling of labor supply and sectoral choice and mobility in a life 
cycle context, where we in addition allow for habit persistence. The approach is analogous to 
Heckman and McCurdy (1980). As in the previous example we assume that time is discrete. However, 
the corresponding continuous time version can be treated similarly. In this section we assume that the 
agent is bounded rational in the sense that she or he is uncertain about the future tastes, interests and 
wages and is only able to make predictions about the level of these variables but may revise plans at 
each epoch due to unanticipated information. Let tC denote consumption in period t and tjz  and tjh  the 
wage and hours of work in sector j in period t. Furthermore, let tA be the wealth at the end of period 
1,t − and r the interest rate. Length of life is T. Conditional on occupation j in period t the agent faces 
the budget constraint 
(7.3)    ( )1 1 .
t
t tj tj t t
j B
A h z r A C+
∈
= + + −  
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Let 1 2( , ,..., ).t t t tmh h h=h  Assume that the life time utility is additive separable with period-specific 
utility given by 
(7.4)   ( )1 1 2 2( , ) ( )t t t t t t t tk tk tku C u C u hξ γ ξ= + h  
where 1 2{ , , }t t tkξ ξ γ  are positive random taste shifters and 1tu  and 2tu are respectively strictly 
increasing and decreasing, concave differentiable functions. The taste shifters are assumed to be 
realizations of random variables. At time t, current and future taste-shifters 1 2{ , , , }k T tτ τ τξ ξ γ τ≥ ≥  are 
known by the agent, but at the next point in time t+1, the agent draws new current and future taste-
shifters 1 2{ , , , 1}.k T tτ τ τξ ξ γ τ≥ ≥ +  How these taste-shifters are distributed and serially correlated will 
be discussed in a moment. Thus, similarly to the previous setup in this paper, the agent is assumed to 
be uncertain about his preference evaluations and may shift her or his tastes over time in a manner that 
is not fully foreseeable to her or him. As regards future interest rates, wages and prices the agent 
behave in each period as if they were known with perfect certainty but may adjust these at the next 
moment in time. The structure in (7.4) implies that at each moment in time, the occupations are perfect 
substitutes in the sense that by suitably adjusting the respective workloads the jobs will be equally 
attractive, provided the wages are equal across occupations. The agent’s optimization problem in 
period t is to maximize 
    ( ) ( )1 1,t t t t tu C V Aβ + ++ h  
subject to (7.3), given tA , where ( )t tV A  is the value function given the agent’s information at period 
t. To facilitate optimization it is convenient to reformulate the problem as follows: Let tj tj tjx h γ=  and 
tj tj tjz z= γ . With this notation the optimization problem consists in maximizing 
(7.5)   ( )1 1 2 2 1 1( )
t
t t t t tj t t t
j B
u C u x V Aξ ξ β + +
∈
 
+ +      
subject to 
                       ( )1 1
t
t tj tj t t
j B
A x z r A C+
∈
= + + −  . 
Since the modified workloads, represented by { },tjx  enter symmetrically in (7.5), it follows that the 
agent will prefer to work at most in one sector, namely in the sector with the highest value of the 
modified wage rates { }.tjz  In other words, the index J of the chosen sector is determined by 
                    if max
t
t tj tkk B
J j z z
∈
= =  . 
Furthermore, consumption, hours of work and wealth are determined such that 
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           ( )1 1t t t tu C ξ λ′ =  
and  
    ( )2 2 ,t tJ t t tJu x zξ λ′− ≥   
where tλ is the marginal utility of wealth as of period (year) t. In particular, the agent will not work in 
period t if 
    1 2 2(0) max
t
t t t tJ tkk B
u z zλ ξ−
∈
′
− > =  . 
The marginal utility of wealth is determined by the Euler condition 
(7.6)        ( ) , 11 ,t t t trλ β λ += +  
where we recall that the interest rate tr  is the interest rate as of period t and is assumed by the agent to 
be equal to all future interest rates, and , ,t qλ  q > t, is the marginal utility of wealth as of period q, 
(with )t ttλ λ=  given the taste shifters 1 2{ , , , }.k tτ τ τξ ξ γ τ ≥  From (7.3) it then follows that 
(7.7)                                              (1 ) .T t T tt tT trλ λ β − −= +  
Specifically, the term tTλ  will be assumed to have the structure tT T tλ λ κ= , where Tλ  is an individual 
fixed effect whereas tκ  is a random variable. Recall that in the special case with perfect foresight 
there are no random variations in tastes as perceived by the agent. This case is captured by letting 
1.tκ =  Define ( ) log ,j tjV t z=  for j > 0, and 0 2 2( ) log( (0) / ).t t tV t u ξ λ′= −  We see that the agent’s 
behavior at any point in time is completely determined by maximizing the function ( ).jV t  Assume 
furthermore that tjz  has the structure ,tj tj j tjz z α ζ=  and ,tj j tjγ γ δ=  where tjz  is a function of observed 
variables representing the level of human capital, jα  is an individual and sector-specific effect, jγ  is a 
sector specific constant and tjδ and tjζ  are random terms. It follows that we can write 
(7.8)   ( ) log( ) log log log( ),j tj j j tj tjV t z α γ δ ζ= + + +  
for 0,j >  and 
(7.9)  0 2 2( ) log( (0)) log ( ) log(1 ) ( ) log( ) log( / ).t T t t tV t u T t r T tλ β ξ κ′= − + − − + − − +   
Recall that the terms { }tj tjδ ζ  and 2{ / }t tξ κ  vary over time in a manner that is stochastic to the 
individual agent due to the fact that she or he is allowed to revise current and future tastes. Now 
assume that Assumptions 1 to 3 hold. Then it follows from Corollary 1 that the random terms { }tj tjδ ζ  
and 2{ / }t tξ κ  can be expressed as log( ) ( ) /tj tj j tδ ζ η σ=  and 2 0log( / ) ( ) / ,t t tξ κ η σ=  where σ  is a 
suitable constant and 0 1( ) ( ( ), ( ),...)t t tη η η=  is standard multivariate type III extreme value distributed 
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at each moment in time, and is also serially independent. The parameter σ  is a dispersion parameter 
that serves to normalize such that ( )j tη has standard type III extreme value distribution. Hence it 
follows from (7.8) and (7.9) that 
(7.10)   ( ) max( ( 1) , ( )).j j jU t U t V tθ σ= − −  
As a result, the choice process, conditional on the fixed effects { }jα  and ,Tλ is a Markov process with 
corresponding transition probabilities and probabilities of being in the respective states given by 
Theorem 2 with ( ) ( ) ( ),j j jV t w t tσ η= +  where 
(7.11)        ( )( ) log log( ),j tj j jw t zσ σ α γ= +  
for 0,j >  and  
(7.10)  0 2( ) log( (0)) log ( ) log(1 ) ( ) log( ).t T tw t u T t r T tσ σ λ σ σ β′= − + − − + − −  
Recall that the term 0,θ ≥  is a parameter that represents the degree of habit persistence.  
 This example, as well as the previous one, demonstrates how one can fruitfully apply the 
theory developed in this paper to provide theoretically justified functional form and distributional 
properties of random components in structural models. 
8. Conclusion 
In this paper we have discussed the issue of functional form of multistate duration models generated 
by discrete choice over time, with particular reference to random tastes and habit persistence. We have 
proposed a particular characterization of exogenous random preferences conditional on the 
information available to the agent. We have demonstrated that this implies preferences that can be 
represented by modified extremal utility processes. From this result a number of important results 
follow: First, the choice model under the absence of state dependence and conditional on information 
available to the agent, is a Markov chain in continuous time. Second, the transition intensities (hazard 
functions) and probabilities of being in a particular state of this Markov chain model have a tractable 
structure as functions of the parameters of the utility function. We have furthermore considered 
extensions that allow for structural state dependence and we have discussed identification and 
estimation in the presence of fixed and random effects. Finally, we have discussed the application of 
the framework for modeling occupational mobility in both a static and a life cycle setting without and 
with uncertainty. The implication of this modeling framework is that provided the researcher knows 
the distribution of unobservables that are known to the individual agent, one can separate true state 
dependence effects from habit persistence and unobserved heterogeneity. As we have discussed in this 
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paper, this is particularly true when the unobservables (known to the individual agent), can be 
represented as fixed or random effects. 
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Appendix A 
To prove Theorem 1 we need the following lemmas. 
 
 Lemma 1 
 Let 1 2( , ,..., )mF x x x  be a type III multivariate extreme value c.d.f. defined on .
mR  Then  
1 2log ( , ,..., )mF x x x−  is a convex function. 
 
Proof of Lemma 1: 
From Theorem 5.11´ in Resnick (1987, p. 272) it follows that one can write 
 
1
1 2
0
log ( , ,..., ) max ( ( ) )jxm j m jF x x x f s e ds
−
≤− =  , 
where ( ), 1,2,.., ,jf s j m=  are nonnegative integrable functions such that  
  
1
0
( ) 1.jf s ds =  
Since ( ) jxjf s e
− is convex as a function of jx it follows that max ( ( ) )j
x
j m jf s e
−
≤ is a convex function in 
1 2( , ,..., )mx x x  for each s. Since sums of convex functions are convex a suitable limit argument yields 
that the integral of max ( ( ) )jxj m jf s e
−
≤ with respect to s is convex. 
           Q.E.D. 
 Lemma 2 
 Under Assumtions 1 and 2 the distribution of ( ) ( ) ( )t U t v tε = −  is a multivariate extreme 
value distribution type III which is independent of time. 
 
Proof of Lemma 2: 
From Assumption 2 it follows that at each given point in time t, ( )tε is independent of ( ),v t  where   
can vary freely on the real line. It will be convenient to normalize such that ( ) 0.5772jE tε =  (Euler’s 
constant). Under Assumptions 1 and 2 it follows from Lindberg et al. (1995) that the joint distribution 
of ( )tε has the form 1 2(exp( ( , ,..., ))),myy yH e e eψ −− −−  where ψ a positive and strictly increasing 
mapping on [0,1] with (0) 0ψ = and (1) 1,ψ =   and 1 2( , ,..., )mH x x x  is a positive increasing and linear 
homogenous function defined on [0, ) ,m∞ and may depend on time. In addition, H must satisfy 
suitable regularity conditions that ensures that 1 2(exp( ( , ,..., )))myy yH e e eψ −− −−   is a multivariate c.d.f. 
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(McFadden, 1978). Since by Assumption 2, 1( )tε is independent of ( )j tε for \{1}j S∈ , the joint 
distribution of 1( ( ), ( ))jt tε ε  must be a product of type III extreme value distributions, which implies 
that  
 1(max( ( ), ( )) ) exp( ) (exp( ( ,1,1,.., ,1,.,1)))
y y y y
jP t t y e e H e eε ε ψ− − − −≤ = − − = −    
 (exp( (1,1,...,1))).ye Hψ −= −   
The last equation implies that ( ) ,ax xψ = for [0,1],x∈ where a is an arbitrary positive constant.  
Hence, we have proved that the c.d.f of ( )tε is a type III multivariate extreme value distribution at 
each given point in time.         
           Q.E.D. 
 
Let A be any subset of S. Define ( ) max ( ).A k A kU t U t∈=   
 
 Lemma 3 
 Assume that Axioms 1 and 2 hold. Then the joint distribution of ( ( ), ( )),A AU s U t  for s < t, is a 
bivariate extreme value distribution (type III). 
 
Proof of Lemma 3:  
Let the function 1 2( , )AG u u  be defined on [0, ) [0, )∞ × ∞ by 
(A.1)   ( )exp( ( , )) ( ) , ( ) ,x yA A AG e e P U s x U t y− −− = ≤ ≤  
for .A S⊂  For notational convenience we normalize such that 1(1,0) (1,0) 1.AG G= =  This 
normalization is possible and does not imply any loss of generality since, by Assumption 2, the 
structural part of the utility function is independent of the random part.  Let z be an arbitrary real 
number. Let now \{1}A S⊂  and note that the process  1{( ( ), ( ) ), 0}AU t U t z t+ ≥  also satisfies 
Assumptions 1 to 3, provided the process 1{( ( ), ( )), 0}AU t U t t ≥  satisfies Assumptions 1 to 3. Lemma 2 
implies that ( )AU t  is type III extreme value distributed. Since the utility processes associated with 
state 1 and j are independent, we obtain that 
(A.2)  
( ) ( )( )
( )( )
( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
1 1
1 1
1 1
( ) ( ),max ( ), ( ) ( , ),max ( ), ( )
( ) ( ) ( , ),max ( ), ( )
( ) , ( ) , ( ) ( , ), ( )
( ) , ( ) ( ) ( , ), ( )
exp (
A A A
A A
A A
A A
z
A
P U s z U s U s U s z x x dx U t U t z y
P U s z U s x x dx U t U t z y
P U s x z U t y z U s x x dx U t y
P U s x z U t y z P U s x x dx U t y
G e
+ < + ∈ + + ≤
= + < ∈ + + ≤
= ≤ − ≤ − ∈ + ≤
= ≤ − ≤ − ∈ + ≤
= −( )1 1 1, ) ( , ) ( , )) ,x z y x y x x ye G e e e G e e dx− − − − − − −− ∂
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where k∂ denotes the partial derivative with respect to the k-th component. Similarly 
    ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )1 1 1max ( ), ( ) ,max ( ), ( ) exp ( , ) ,x y z x z yA A AP U s U s z x U t U t z y G e e G e e− − − −+ ≤ + ≤ = − − , 
which implies that 
(A.3)  
( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( )
1 1
1 1 1 1
max ( ), ( ) ( , ),max ( ), ( )
exp ( , ) , ( , ) , .
A A
x y z x z y x y z z x z y x
A A
P U s U s z x x dx U t U t z y
G e e G e e G e e e G e e e dx− − − − − − − − −
+ ∈ + + ≤
= − − ∂ + ∂
 
Assumption 1 implies that 
(A.4)     
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )
1 1
1 1 1
max ( ), ( ) , ,max ( ), ( ) , ( ) 1
max ( ), ( ) , ,max ( ), ( ) ( ) ( ) .
A A B
A A A
P U s U s z x x dx U t U t z y J s
P U s U s z x x dx U t U t z y P U s U s z
+ ∈ + + ≤ =
= + ∈ + + ≤ > +
 
When (A.1) and (A.3) are inserted into (A.4) we obtain 
           
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
exp , , ,
( ( ) ( ) ) exp , , , ,
x y z x z y x y
A
x y z x z y x y z z x z y
A A A
G e e G e e G e e
P U s U s z G e e G e e G e e e G e e
− − − − − −
− − − − − − − −
− − ∂
= > + ⋅ − − ∂ + ∂
 
which is equivalent to 
(A.5)  ( ) ( )1 1 1 1 1, ( ( ) ( ) ) , ( ( ) ( ) ).x y z z x z yA A AG e e P U s U s z e G e e P U s U s z− − − −∂ < + = ∂ > +  
Furthermore, since 1( )U s and ( )AU s  are independent, 1(1,0) (1,0) 1,AG G= =  ( ,0) (1,0),
z z
A AG e e G= it 
follows that 
(A.6) 1
1 1
( ,0) (1,0)( ( ) ( ) ) .
(1,0) ( ,0) (1,0) (1,0) 1
z z z
A A
A z z z
A A
G e G e eP U s U s z
G G e G G e e
< + = = =
+ + +
 
When (A.6) is inserted into (A.5) it follows that  
(A.7)   ( ) ( )1 1 1, , .x y z x z yAG e e G e e− − − −∂ = ∂  
By integrating (A.7) with respect to x we obtain 
(A.8)                                ( ) ( )1 , , ( )x y z z x z yA AG e e e G e e K y− − − − −= + , 
for some function ( )AK y that does not depend on x nor z. Since  1 1(0, ) (0,1)
y yG e G e− −=  and 
(0, ) (0, ) (0,1) ,z z y y yA A Ae G e G e G e
− − − −
= =  it follows from (A.8), with z = 0, that  
(A.9)   1( ) ( (0,1) (0,1)) .
y
A AK y G G e
−
= −  
From (A.8) and (A.9) we therefore get that  
(A.10)  ( ) ( )1 1, , ( (0,1) (0,1)) .z z x z y x y yA Ae G e e G e e G G e− − − − − −= + −  
Eq. (A.10) is valid for any real z and since the right hand side of (A.10) does not depend on z we get 
(A.11)   ( ) ( ), , ,z z x z y x yA Ae G e e G e e− − − − −=  
for all real z. Similarly, it follows from (A.10) and (A.11) that 
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       1 1( , ) ( (0,1) (0,1)) ( , )
z z x z y y z z x z y
A Ae G e e G G e e G e e
− − − − − − −
= − +  
  1 1( ( ,0) ( ,0)) ( , ) ( , )
y
A AG G e G x y G x y
−
= ∞ − ∞ + = , 
which proves that (A.11) also holds for A = {1}. But this means that the bivariate c.d.f. defined in 
(A.1) is a bivariate type III extreme value distribution for any ,A S∈ and therefore the proof of Lemma 
3 is complete. 
  Q.E.D. 
Proof of Theorem 1: 
For ,A S⊂  let ( ) ( ,1)zA Az G eϕ =  where AG  is defined in (A.1). For \{1}A S⊂  define 
1( ) ( ) ( ).A Az z zψ ϕ ϕ= +  From these definitions it follows that for any ,A S⊂     
(A.12)    ( , ) ( ,1) ( )x y y y x yA A AG e e e G e e y xϕ− − − − −= = −  
and 
(A.13)    1 ( , ) ( )
x x y y
A Ae G e e e y xϕ− − − − ′∂ = −  and  2 ( , ) ( ( ) ( )).y x y yA A Ae G e e e y x y xϕ ϕ− − − − ′∂ = − − −  
Moreover, for \ {1}A S∈  and {1, },B A=  
(A.14) ( ) 1max ( ) exp( (0, ) (0, )) exp( ( )).y y yk B k A AP U t y G e G e e ψ− − −∈ ≤ = − − = − −∞   
Let 
   ( ( ) , ( ) ) ( ),ij B B AC P J s i J t j ψ= = = −∞  
for , .i j B∈  From (A.12) to (A.14) and Assumption 1 we get that 
 1 exp( ( )) ( ) ( ( ) 1, ( ) , ( ) ( , ))
y y
A B B BC e e y o y P J s J t A U t y y yψ− −− −∞ Δ + Δ = = ∈ ∈ + Δ  
  1 1( ( ) , ( ) ( , ), ( ) , ( ) ( , ))A A
R
P U s x U s x x dx U t y U t y y y= ≤ ∈ + ≤ ∈ + Δ  
  1 1 1 1 2exp( ( , ) ( , )) ( , ) ( , )
x y x y x y x y x y
A A
R
y G e e G e e G e e G e e e dx− − − − − − − − − −= Δ ∂ − − ∂ ∂  
  2 1exp( ( )) ( )( ( ) ( )) .
y y
A A A
R
y e y x e y x y x y x dxψ ϕ ϕ ϕ− − ′ ′= Δ − − − − − −  
By dividing the last equation by ye y− Δ  and letting 0,yΔ →  we obtain that 
(A.15)     1 1exp( ( )) exp( ( )) ( )( ( ) ( )) .
y y y
A A A A
R
C e e e y x y x y x y x dxψ ψ ϕ ϕ ϕ− − − ′ ′− −∞ = − − − − − −  
Note furthermore that since ( ) ,Aψ ∞ = ∞ one can write 
(A.16)      exp( ( )) exp( ( )) ( ) .y y yA A Ae e e z z dzψ ψ ψ
∞
− − −
−∞
′
− −∞ = −  
By change-of-variable; z y x= −  in the integral in (A.15), (A.15) and (A.16) yield 
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(A.17)     1 1exp( ( )) ( ) exp( ( )) ( )( ( ) ( )) .
y y
A A AC e z z dz e z z z z dzψ ψ ψ ϕ ϕ ϕ
∞ ∞
− −
−∞ −∞
′ ′ ′
− = − −   
Note next that by Lemma 1, 1( ),zϕ  ( )A zϕ  and ( )A zψ  are increasing and convex functions, which 
implies that ( )A zψ ′  is non-decreasing. Define c = −∞  if ( ) 0A zψ ′ >  for all real z, otherwise define 
max{ : ( ) 0}.Ac z zψ ′= =  It thus follows that Aψ is strictly increasing and invertible for z > c. Let 
{ : ( ), 0}.Aw w z zψΩ = = >  Let h  be the inverse function of ,Aψ  defined on .Ω  By the change of 
variable, ( ),w h z=  (A.17), with ,yeλ −=  becomes 
(A.18)  1 1exp( ) exp( ) ( ( ))( ( ( )) ( ( ))) ,( ( ))A A A A
dwC w dw w h w h w h w
h w
λ λ ϕ ϕ ϕ
ψΩ Ω
′ ′
− = − −
′
   
which must hold for every positive .λ  By the uniqueness property of the Laplace transform 
(A.18) implies that 
   11
( ( ))( ( ( )) ( ( )))
( ( ))
A A
A
A
h w h w h wC
h w
ϕ ϕ ϕ
ψ
′ ′
−
=
′
, 
for ,w∈Ω  which is equivalent to  
(A.19)    1 1( ) ( )( ( ) ( )).A A A AC z z z zψ ϕ ϕ ϕ′ ′ ′= −  
for .z c>  Similarly, it follows by symmetry that 
(A.20)    1 1 1( ) ( )( ( ) ( )),A A AC z z z zψ ϕ ϕ ϕ′ ′ ′= −  
for .z c>  By subtracting (A.20) from (A.19) and dividing by 2( )zψ  we obtain 
(A.21)          1 1 1 12 2
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) .
( ) ( )
A A A A A
A A
z z z z z C C
z z
ϕ ψ ϕ ψ ψ
ψ ψ
′ ′ ′
− −
=  
When we integrate both sides of (A.21) we get that 
    1 1 1 1
( ) ,
( ) ( )
A A
A A
z C C d
z z
ϕ
ψ ψ
−
= +  
for ,z c>  where 1d is an arbitrary constant. This is equivalent to 
(A.22)     1 1 1 1( ) ( ).A A Az C C d zϕ ψ= − +  
Similarly, it follows by symmetry that 
(A.23)    1 1( ) ( ),A A A A Az C C d zϕ ψ= − +   
where Ad is an arbitrary constant. When the equation in (A.22) is inserted for 1( )zϕ into eq. (A.19) it 
follows that 
(A.24)    1
1
( ) ( ) .AA A
Cz z
d
ϕ ϕ′− =  
Similarly, when the equation in (A.23) is inserted for ( )A zϕ into eq. (A.20) it follows that   
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(A.25)     11 1( ) ( ) .A
A
Cz z
d
ϕ ϕ′− =  
Eq. (A.24) and (A.25) are first order differential equations that have solutions of the form 
(A.26)    ( ) ,zj j jz eϕ α β= +  
for j = 1 and j = A, respectively, and z > c, where jα  and jβ are suitable constants. Since ( ) 0j zϕ′ =  
for z c≤ and ( )j zϕ is continuous it follows from (A.26) that we can write 
(A.27)    ( ) exp(max( , )),j j jz c zϕ α β= +  
for any real .z  Using (A.12) we obtain, as a consequence of (A.27), that 
(A.28)  ( , ) exp(max( , )) exp( min( , )),x y y y yj j j j jG e e e e c y x e x y cα β α β− − − − −= + − = + − −  
for j = 1, A. The equation in (A.28) implies that the utility process  { ( ), 0}jU t t ≥ , ,j B∈ is equivalent 
to the utility process generated by 
(A.29)   ( ) max( ( ) , ( , )),j j jU t U s c W s t= +  
for 1, ,j A=  \ {1},A S⊂ where ( , )jW s t  is type III extreme value distributed and independent of 
( ).jU s  Since A can be a singleton, we conclude that (A.29) must hold for any .j S∈   
 We next prove that ( ) ,c s t θ= − −  where θ is a positive constant. To emphasize that c depends 
on s and t we write henceforth c = c(s, t). Under Assumption 3 it must be true that ( , ) ( ).c s t c t s= −  
From (A.29) it follows for s < r < t, that 
  ( ) max( ( ) ( , ), ( , ))j j jU t U r c r t W r t= +  and ( ) max( ( ) ( , ), ( , ))j j jU r U s c s r W s r= + , 
which, together with (A.31) imply that 
(A.30) ( ) max( ( ) ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ), ( , )) max( ( ) ( , ), ( , )).j j j j j jU t U s c s r c r t W s r c r t W r t U s c s t W s t= + + + = +  
Furthermore, (A,29) and (A.30) imply that ( ) ( ) ( ),c t s c r s c t r− = − + −  which must hold for any s < r 
< t. Let x r s= −  and .y t r= −  The latter equation is equivalent to 
(A.31)    ( ) ( ) ( ),c x y c x c y+ = +  
which must hold for all positive x and y. The equation in (A.31) is a functional equation of the Cauchy 
type and the only possible solution is ( ) ,c x xθ= −  where θ is a constant, see for example Theorem 3.2 
in Falmagne (1985, p. 82). The constant θ must be positive because otherwise { ( ), 0}jU t t ≥  cannot be 
stationary, as is easily verified. Moreover, Tiago de Oliveira (1973) has demonstrated that the 
representation (2.1) in fact is a strictly stationary (Markovian) stochastic process in continuous time.  
 Finally, we shall prove that the corresponding vector equation ( ) max( ( ) , ( , ))U t U s c W s t= +  
holds, with the vector ( , )W s t  independent of U(s). Without essential loss of generality and for the 
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sake of simplicity we shall only give the proof for the bivariate case, that is, for the case where 
2 3( ) ( ( ), ( ))U s U s U s=  and 2 3( , ) ( ( , ), ( , )).W s t W s t W s t=  Recall that we have proved that ( )jU s is 
independent of ( , )jW s t  for any j, but it remains to prove that 2 ( , )W s t  is independent of 3 ( ),U s  and 
3 ( , )W s t  is independent of 2 ( ).U t  Recall that we have demonstrated that ( )AU s and ( , )AW s t  are 
independent and type III extreme value distributed for any .A S⊂  Let ( ) ( ) ( )j j jt U t v tε = −  and 
( , ) ( , ) ( , ),j j js t W s t w s tξ = −  where ( )j sε  and ( , )j s tξ  are standard type III extreme value distributed 
variables, and ( )jv t  and ( , )jw s t  are deterministic terms. It follows from (A.29) that 
( , ) log(exp( ( )) exp( ( ) ( ) )).j j jw s t v t v s t s θ= − − −  By Lemma 2 we can write 
(A.32)        2 3 23( ( ) , ( ) ) exp( ( , ))
x yP t x t y H e eε ε − −≤ ≤ = −  
where the function 23 ( , )H u v  is defined on [0, ) [0, )∞ × ∞ and is positive, linear homogeneous and 
increasing, and is independent of time. Because of (A.29) we have, with A = {2,3}, that 
(A.33)    2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3max( ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ( ) , ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , ))s v s t s s v s t s s t w s t s t w s tε θ ε θ ξ ξ+ − − + − − + +  
  2 2 3 3max( ( ) ( ), ( ) ( )).t v t t v tε ε= + +  
Consider the special case with ( ) ( ) ,j j jv s v t v= =  implying that 
( , ) log(1 exp( ( ) )) .j j jw s t v t s vθ κ= + − − − ≡ +  Then, in this case (A.33) implies that 
(A.34) 2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3( ( ) ( ) , ( ) ( ) ) ( ( , ) , ( , ) )P s y t s v s y t s v P s t y v s t y vε θ ε θ ξ κ ξ κ≤ + − − ≤ + − − ≤ − − ≤ − −  
 2 2 3 3( ( ) , ( ) ).P t y v t y vε ε= ≤ − ≤ −  
If we combine (A.32) with (A.34) we obtain, by using the linear homogeneity property of 23 ,H that 
          3 32 2 ( )( )2 2 3 3 23 23( ( , ) , ( , ) ) exp( ( , ) ( , ))
v y v y t sv y v y t sP s t y v s t y v H e e H e e θθξ κ ξ κ − − − −− − − −≤ − − ≤ − − = − +  
  3 32 2( )23 23exp( ( , ) ( , ))
v y v yv y v yt sH e e e H e eθ− −− −− −= − +  
  3 32 223 23exp( ( , )) exp( ( , )).
v y v yv y v ye H e e H e eκκκ − + −− + −= − = −  
Since , 2,3,jv j =  can vary freely the latter equation is equivalent to 
(A.35)  322 2 3 3 23( ( , ) , ( , ) ) exp( ( , )),
yyP s t y s t y H e eξ ξ −−≤ ≤ = −  
where , 2,3,jy j =  are any real numbers. Hence we have proved that the c.d.f. of 2 3( ( , ), ( , ))s t s tξ ξ is 
independent of time and of the structural terms ( , ), 2,3.jw s t j =  Furthermore, since ( )AU s and 
( , )AW s t  are independent we have that 
         ( ( ) , ( , ) ) ( ( ) ) ( ( , ) )A A A AP U s x W s t y P U s x P W s t y≤ ≤ = ≤ ≤  
         2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3( ( ) ( ), ( ) ( )) ( ( , ) ( , ), ( , ) ( , )).P s x v s s x v s P s t y w s t s t y w s tε ε ξ ξ= ≤ − ≤ − ≤ − ≤ −  
 42
Note that the terms ( )jv s and ( , ), 2,3,jw s t j =  can vary freely on the real line. Thus the last equation is 
equivalent to  
(A.36)  2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3( ( ) , ( ) , ( , ) , ( , ) )P s x s x s t y s t yε ε ξ ξ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
  2 2 3 3 2 2 3 3( ( ) , ( ) ) ( ( , ) , ( , ) ).P s x s x P s t y s t yε ε ξ ξ= ≤ ≤ ≤ ≤  
Eq. (A.36) implies that 2 3( ( ), ( ))s sε ε  and 2 3( ( , ), ( , ))s t s tξ ξ are independent, which implies that 
2 3( ( ), ( ))U s U s  and 2 3( ( , ), ( , ))W s t W s t are independent. This completes the proof. 
           Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Theorem 2: 
We shall demonstrate Theorem 2 follows from Dagsvik (1988). Let ( )tG x  be defined as in Dagsvik 
(1988), namely by ( ) log ( ( ) ) log ( (0, ) ).tG x P U t x P W t x= − ≤ = − ≤  Then it follows that  
    
0
( )( ) | .tj
xj
G xV t
x =
∂
= −
∂
 
Furthermore, note that  
    ( ) (0).k t
k B
V t G
∈
=  
Now the result of Theorem 2 follows from Theorem 3, p. 34, of Dagsvik (1988). 
                    Q.E.D. 
 
 Lemma 4 
 Let { ( ), 0}Z t t ≥  be a standard extremal process defined as follows:  
(i) (0) ,Z = −∞  
(ii) ( ) max( ( ), ( , )),Z t Z s Y s t= for s < t, where ( , )Y s t is a random variable that is independent of ( ),Z s  
(iii) ( , )Y s t  and ( ', ')Y s t are independent whenever ( , ) ( ', ') ,s t s t∩ = ∅  
(vi)  ( ( , ) ) exp( ( ) ),uP Y s t u t s e−≤ = − −  for real u.  
If ( ), ,jU t j S∈  are independent modified extremal utility processes (as defined in Theorem 1) we have 
that 
(A.37)  ( ) ( ( )) ,j j jU t Z V t tθ= −  
where ,{ ( ), 0},jZ t t j S≥ ∈  are independent standard extremal processes and 
(A.38)  
0
( ) exp( ( ) ) ,
t
j j jV t w d cτ θτ τ= + +  
 43
where 0θ ≥ is a constant and { ( )}jw τ  are deterministic terms. 
 
Proof of Lemma 4: 
Consider the three-dimensional distributions of { ( ), 0}.Z t t ≥ It follows from the definition above in the 
statement of the lemma that for real ,jx j = 1, 2, 3, and 1 2 3 ,t t t< < that 
 1 2 3 2 3 3min( , , ) min( , )1 1 2 2 3 3 1 2 1 3 2( ( ) , ( ) , ( ) ) exp( ( ) ( ) ).
x x x x x xP Z t x Z t x Z t x t e t t e t t e− − −≤ ≤ ≤ = − − − − −  
Furthermore, it follows from the definition of H in (2.2) that when the utility processes are 
independent that 
   1 2 1 2( , ,..., ) ,m mH y y y y y y= + + ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ +  
so that  
 ( ( , ) ) exp exp( ( ) ) exp( ( ( ) ( ))).
t
u u
j j j j
s
P W s t t u e w d e V t V sθ τ τθ τ− − + ≤ = − + = − −    
Let ˆ ( ) ( ) .j jU t U t tθ= +  The corresponding updating relation is given by 
   ˆ ˆ( ) max( ( ), ( , ) ).j j jU t U s W s t tθ= +  
Moreover, (A.37) is equivalent to ˆ ( ) ( ( )).j j jU t Z V t=  Hence, we obtain that 
   1 1 2 2 3 3( ( ) , ( ) , ( ) )j j jP U t x U t x U t x≤ ≤ ≤  
       1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3ˆ ˆ ˆ( ( ) ,max( ( ), ( , ) ) ,max( ( ), ( , ) , ( , ) )) )j j j j j jP U t x U t W t t t x U t W t t t W t t t xθ θ θ≤ + ≤ + + ≤  
            1 2 3 2 3 3min( , , ) min( , )1 2 1 3 2exp( ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( )) ).
x x x x x x
j j j j jV t e V t V t e V t V t e
− − −
= − − − − −  
It is easy to verify that the last expression is same as  
  1 1 2 2 3 3( ( ( )) , ( ( )) , ( ( )) ).j j j j j jP Z V t x Z V t x Z V t x≤ ≤ ≤  
For the higher dimensional distributions the computation is entirely analogous. This completes the 
proof. 
                      Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Theorem 3: 
For any choice set B, let ( ) 1jI B =  if ,j B∈  and zero otherwise. Define independent utility processes, 
{ ( ), 0},jU t t
∗ ≥ by 
(A.39)         ( ) ( ( )) ,j j jU t Z V t tθ∗ ∗= −  
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where { ( ), 0},jZ t t ≥ j =1, 2, …., m, are independent standard extremal processes, and 
( ) ( ) ( ( )).j j jV t V t I B t
∗
=  Evidently, ( )jV t
∗ is a non-decreasing function in t when the choice set process 
is non-decreasing. Consequently, Lemma 4 implies that the utility processes defined in (A.39) are 
modified extremal processes. Thus, the results of Theorem 2 and Corollary 2 go through with 
( )jV t replaced by ( ).jV t
∗  Hence, the result of Theorem 3 follows. 
            Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Theorem 4: 
Let ( , ( ))jU t h t  be defined as in Assumption 4. Let 1 2( , ( )) ( ( , ( )), ( , ( )))U t h t U t h t U t h t=  and 
1 2( , ( )) ( ( , ( )), ( , ( ))).w t h t w t h t w t h t=  For notational simplicity, define 
(A.40) ( ) ( )( ) ( )( )( )1 1 2 2exp exp , ( ) exp , ( ) for , 1,2,, ( )
0 otherwise.
j j
t
w t h t y w t h t y y x j
M y x h t
θ − − − − ≥ + =
= 
 
Due to the form of the extreme value distribution it follows that the conditional distribution of  
U(t, h(t)) given ( 1, ( 1))U t h t− −  and given the choice history can be expressed as 
 
(A.41)  ( ) ( )( , ( )) ( 1, ( 1)) , ( )tP U t h t y U t h t x M y x h t≤ − − = =  for  , 1,2j jy x jθ≥ + = ,  
 
and zero otherwise. Let ( ), 1,2,...,j τ τ =  be a sequence of choices and define 1 2( ) ( ( ), ( ))u t u t u t=  and
        ( ){ }( )( ) (1), (2),..., ( ) : ( ) max ( ), .j k kt u u u t u u tτ τ τ τΩ = = ∀ ≤  
We have 
(A.42)  ( ) ( )*
1( )
( ) ( ), 1,2,..., ( ) ( 1), ( )
t
t
P J j t d M u u hτ
τ
τ τ τ τ τ τ
=Ω
= = = −∏  
where (0) ( , )u = −∞ −∞ , and                   
  { }*( ) ( ) ( ), 1 .h J s j s sτ τ= = ∀ ≤ −  
Let Mt(y|x) be given by (A.40) when ( ), ( )w t h t  is replaced by ( )w t . Define 
(A.43)  ( ) ( )*
1( )
( 1), ( ), ( ) ( 1) .
t
t
L h t w s s t dM u uτ
τ
τ τ
=Ω
+ ≤ ≡ −∏  
Clearly, (A.43) is the likelihood function under pure taste persistence. We know from Theorem 2 that 
the likelihood function in (A.43) has a structure that implies a Markovian choice process under pure 
taste persistence. But when ( )(1), (2),..., ( ) ( )U U U t t∈Ω , then the choice history, including the choice at 
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time t, equals *( 1)h t +  and consequently the functions, ( ), ( ) , 1,2,..., ,w s h s s t=  remain fixed when the 
integrand in (A.43) is integrated out over Ω (t). Therefore, we must have that 
(A.44)      ( ) ( )*( ) ( ), 1,2,..., ( 1), ( , ( )), .P J j t L h t w s h s s tτ τ τ ∗= = = + ≤  
Eq. (A.44) implies that state dependence can be conveniently accounted for by replacing { }( )w s  by 
corresponding "experience-modified" functions { ( , ( ))}.w s h s∗  Furthermore, conditional on these 
experience-modified functions the choice process is a Markov chain with transition probabilities that 
have the same structure as in Theorem 2 with { }( ),w s s t≤  replaced by { ( , ( )), }.w s h s s t∗ ≤   
  Q.E.D. 
 
Proof of Corollary 8: 
From (3.10) it follows that 
(A.45)   
( )
\
0
( )
( ) ( )
( )
log ( ) log exp( ( )) ,
t t k
k B
ik jk
k A k B A kd d
k B
t
B
k k
k B k B
V x dx
q x q x dx
V x
V t e H w d cθτκ τ τ κ
∈
∈ ∈
∈
∈ ∈
′ 
+ =  
  
= + = + +     
   
 
 
which proves (6.1). Also from (3.10) we have that                                           
        log ( ) log ( ) log ( ) .j ij k
k B
V t q t V t
∈
 
′ = +     
When the above equation is combined with (A.46) we get that 
 ( )
\
log exp( ( )) ( ) log ( ) ( ) ( )
t
B
j j ij ik jk
k A k B Ad
H w t w t t q t q x q x dxθ
∈ ∈
 
+ + = + +    , 
which proves (6.2) 
  Q.E.D. 
Appendix B 
In this appendix we outline how the transition probabilities and intensities look like when the 
functions wj(t) are step functions that only may change at given time units, such as weeks or months. 
In this case we obtain that 
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(B.1) 
( )( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( )
1
1
exp ( ) exp ( ) exp ( )
1
exp ( ) ( ) .
t rt t
r r
j j j
r s r ss r
t
j
r s
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e
w r t r
θτ θ θ θ
θ
τ τ θ τ θ τ θ θ
θ
θ
− −
= =
−
−
=
− − = − = − −
−
= − −
  

 
As a result of (B.1) it follows from Theorem 2 that the transition and state probabilities can be written 
as 
(B.2)         ( )
( )( )
( )( )1
0 1
exp ( )
,
exp ( ) ( exp( (0)))
t
j
r s
ij t
t
k k k
k r
w t
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τ τ θ
τ τ θ τ
=
−
= =
− −
=  
− − + +  

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for 0 , , 0,1,s t i j i j< ≤ = ≠ , and  
(B.3)          
( )( )
( )( )
1
1
0 1
exp ( ) ( exp( (0)))
( ) ,
exp ( ) ( exp( (0)))
t
t
j j j
r
j t
t
k k k
k r
w t d c w e
P t
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τ τ θ τ
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where 
    .
1
j
j
c
c
e θ
θ
−
=
−
  
The corresponding transition intensities follow from (3.15) and (B.1) and are given by 
(B.4) ( )
( )( )1
0 1
exp( ( ))
.
exp ( ) ( exp( (0)))
j
ij t
t
k k k
k r
w t
q t
w t d c w e θ
θ
τ τ θ τ −
= =
=  
− − + +    
 
From (B.2), (B.3) and (B.4) it is evident that jc may be absorbed in exp( (0)),jw  and we can therefore 
normalize by setting 0.jc =  
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